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1 Introduction
SDRT (Segmented Discourse Representation Theory [1]) introduced the notion
of a veridical discourse relation. A discourse relation R is veridical iff the fol-
lowing rule is valid: R(α, β) ⇒ Kα ∧ Kβ . In words, if R(α, β) is true then the
propositional contents of its arguments, noted asKα andKβ , are also true. Most
discourse relations are veridical (Narration, Contrast, Evidence, Elaboration,
Result, Explanation, ...).
However, the only examples presented in [1] concerning veridical discourse
relations are simple to the extent that they only include assertions of the writer,
as in (1a) analyzed with Narration(α, β).3 When at least one argument of a
discourse relation is not asserted by the writer but attributed to another source
as in (1b) the situation becomes far more complex. In (1b), β is attributed to
Jane. The semantics of the verb claim implies that the writer commits to Jane
committing to the content of β but the writer doesn’t commit to the content of
β: she may think that it is false. In other words, independently of the fact that a
discourse relation is veridical, the expressed propositional attitude (full assertion,
or some weaker form of assertion) towards the content of a discourse segment
must be evaluated relative to one or several source(s), e.g. the writer and Jane
for the segment noted as β in (1b). [1] discusses in great detail complex issues
related to dialogue, but in our understanding, they do not discuss attribution
in monologue which is the subject of this paper. Our main point is to take into
account propositional attitudes so as to handle monologic discourses which do
not only contain writer assertions.
(1)a. (Fred will go to Dax for Christmas)α. Afterwards (he will go to Pau)β .
b. (Fred will go to Dax for Christmas)α. Jane claims that afterwards (he will
go to Pau)β .
3 Narration in SDRT is called Sequence in RST.
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Moreover, following the annotation in the Penn Discourse Tree Bank (PDTB)
[8,6], we argue that it should be one of the goals of discourse analysis to indicate
the sources of the discourse relations at play in a discourse structure. For exam-
ple, it will be shown in Section 4.2 that the source of Narration is Jane in (1b)
and the writer in (2a). Furthermore, the propositional attitude of the discourse
participants towards the semantics of a “discourse constituent” Rsk(α, β) may
vary. For example, it will be shown in Section 4.2 that the writer commits to
the temporal sequential order of Fred’s trips given by afterwards/Narration in
(2a) but doesn’t in (2b).
(2)a. Fred will go to Dax for Christmas. Jane doesn’t know that afterwards he
will go to Pau.
b. Fred will go to Dax for Christmas. I believe that afterwards he will go to
Pau.
In sum, discourse in which some segments are not asserted by the writer —
which are quite frequent in the journalistic genre — require a new paradigm
for discourse analysis in which each discourse constituent of the form R(α, β)
is annotated with information on the sources of its elements (R, α and β) and
the propositional attitude of the relevant agents towards their semantics. This
paradigm crucially relies on information about which discourse participants be-
lieve which proposition to what degree, as expressed in FactBank [11].
Section 2 gives a brief introduction to FactBank. Section 3 presents our new
paradigm for discourse analysis. Section 4 explains the new paradigm.
2 FactBank
FactBank is an English corpus annotated with expressed propositional attitude,
which it calls “factuality” [10,11]. FactBank is not concerned with discourse
relations and discourse analysis. It is concerned only with events (eventualities)
whose propositional attitude values are worked out clause by clause, without
taking into account the discourse context or world knowledge: these values come
only from lexical semantic knowledge, in particular semantic properties of verbs
with a sentential complement and presence of modality or polarity markers, the
interaction between these various factors being modeled.
The propositional attitude assigned to an event e is relative to the rele-
vant sources at play, the writer and other agents. Therefore, a propositional
attitude is represented as f(e, s) = x, where s refers to the agent who has ex-
pressed the attitude towards e.4 The value x, the propositional attitude, is a
pair (Mod(x), Pol(x)) with a modality value and a polarity value. There exist
4 In fact, the propositional attitude assignments are more complex because of nested
sources as in Julie said that Jane claims Fred will go to Dax. However, nested sources
will be ignored in this paper. This allows us to make the following simplification :
we use f(e, s) instead of f(e, writer − s) used in FactBank for a source s different
from the author.
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four modality values (with an order relation), certain (CT), probable (PR), pos-
sible (PS), unknown (U), and three polarity values, Positive (+), Negative (-),
unknown (u). However, there exist only 8 (and not 12) pairs (Mod(x), Pol(x))
abbreviated asMod(x)Pol(x) because four pairs don’t exist: U+, U−, PRu and
PSu.
Let us give some illustrations of propositional attitudes. In the discourses in
(3a) consisting of a single assertion of the writer, f(eα,Wr) = CT− which means
that according to the writer, it is certainly the case that eα will not happen, with
eα corresponding to the event described in the “positive” version of α, i.e. Fred
will go to Dax. In (3b), f(eα,Wr) = PR+ which means that according to
the writer, it is probably the case that eα will happen, where eα is the event
described in the version of α without modality marker, i.e. Fred will go to Dax.
In (3c), f(eα,Wr) = Uu which means that the writer doesn’t know what is the
factual status of eα or doesn’t commit to it; in contrast, f(eα, Jane) = CT+.
In (3d), f(eα, Jane) = Uu and f(eα,Wr) = CT+. In (3e), f(eα, Jane) = CTu
and f(eα,Wr) = Uu.
(3)a. (Fred will not go to Dax)α.
b. (Fred will probably go to Dax)α.
c. Jane said that (Fred will go to Dax)α.
d. Jane does not know that (Fred will go to Dax)α.
e. Jane knows whether (Fred will go to Dax)α.
We conclude with a remark on the PDTB. As said in Section 1, information
on sources and propositional attitude on each element of a discourse constituent
R(α, β) (i.e. R, α and β) is annotated in PDTB [8], and the new paradigm
we propose is inspired by work on the PDTB. However, propositional attitude
information in the PDTB is not as elaborate as in FactBank, as explained in
[11]. For a more detailed discussion of the PDTB, see [4].
3 New paradigm for discourse analysis
We postulate that, in a dynamic approach, updating the discourse analysis with
a new discourse segment should be performed in four steps:
(i) Work out the propositional attitudes f(e, s) = x for all events e and relevant
agents (including the writer) s in the new segment, using only linguistic
knowledge as in FactBank.
(ii) Update the discourse structure with the new segment using one or more
discourse relations, based, on the one hand, on the propositional attitude
towards these events, and on the other hand, on other linguistic knowledge
as well as world and pragmatic knowledge.
(iii) Identify the source(s) of the newly introduced discourse relations.
(iv) Possibly revise and/or complete the propositional attitudes according to the
updated discourse structure. The propositional attitude assignments after
the update of the discursive analysis with the segment identified as n are
noted fn(e, s).
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We have split the operations performed in steps (ii) and (iii) for sake of clar-
ification. However, we don’t claim that these operations must be performed
sequentially. On the other hand, we do claim that they must be performed after
step (i) and we will show evidence for this claim. Step (iv) naturally comes up
after steps (ii) and (iii) and we insist on the fact that this step is crucial for
many NLP applications such as textual entailment, question-answering and di-
alog, since it is in this step that the propositional attitude information relevant
for such applications is computed [7].
4 Arguments for the New Paradigm
4.1 Propositional Attitude Revision
This section explains — using a quite simple example — the revision of a propo-
sitional attitude, the operation which is performed in step (iv) in our paradigm.
The example in (4a), in which both segments are attributed to the writer, is
analyzed with Evidence(α, β). Consider (4b) in which β is attributed to an-
other source (Jane); (4i) shows the propositional attitudes, and (4ii) the dis-
course structure for (4b). This discourse structure with the relation Evidence
relies on the fact that the writer endorses what Jane said: there is no relation
Evidence in (4c). Therefore interpreting (4b) with EvidenceWr(α, β) implies
fβ(eβ ,Wr) = CT+. There is thus revision of the propositional attitude value
for eβ relative to the writer: fβ(eβ ,Wr) 6= f(eβ ,Wr).
(4)a. (The neighbors have gone on vacation)α. (Newspapers are accumulating
on their doorstep)β .
b. (The neighbors have gone on vacation)α. (Jane told me that)βatt (news-
papers are accumulating on their doorstep)β .
i f(eα,Wr) = CT + ∧ f(eβ ,Wr) = Uu ∧ f(eβ , Jane) = CT+
ii AttributionWr(βatt, β)
5 ∧ EvidenceWr(α, β)
c. The neighbors have gone on vacation. Jane claimed that newspapers are
accumulating on their doorstep, but that is wrong.
In [5], it is postulated that there exist two uses of reportative verbs like say,
an “evidential” use as in (4b) and an “intensional” use as in (4c). With the
evidential use, the writer endorses the content of the embedded clause (noted
γ), which corresponds to Mod(f(eγ ,Wr)) 6= U ∧ Pol(f(eγ ,Wr)) 6= u, while
she doesn’t with the intensional use, f(eγ ,Wr) = Uu. Our examples above
support this claim. However, one of the main arguments put forward in [5] is
that evidential uses of reportative verbs allow felicitous anaphoric links from
indefinites under the scope of embedding verbs to elements in extensional (non
5 As in RST [9], the relation Attribution is used to link an attribution text span (e.g.
Jane told me) to the attributed text span. Attributions(γatt, γ) implies that s claims
that the source of γ is given in γatt. In the examples presented in this paper, γatt
is built around a verb introducing a clausal complement and the source of γ is the
referent of the subject of this verb.
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modal) contexts, while intensional uses don’t. Yet, the situation seems more
complex. For example, think in (5a) should be considered as intensional (as
there is nothing for which evidence is being supplied), and, in accordance with
[5], (5b) is incoherent. On the other hand, (5c) is coherent thanks to the discourse
connective as a matter of fact. Thus, it seems preferable to postulate that there
is a single use of reportative verbs, with different values assigned to f(eγ ,Wr)
and f(eγ , source(γ)) depending on the discourse context, and a possible revision
of these values after discourse structure update. The constraints on anaphoric
reference to indefinites are really based on the propositional attitudes. We leave
an elaboration of a precise account to future work.
(5)a. Jane thinks that her husband has a mistress. She is supposed to be a
redhead.
b. # Jane thinks that her husband has a mistress. She is a redhead.
c. Jane thinks that her husband has a mistress. As a matter of fact, she is a
redhead; he is indeed cheating on her.
4.2 Propositional Attitudes for Discourse Constituents
First, we address the following question: what does it mean to assign a propo-
sitional attitude to the event described in a segment such as β in (6a) which in-
cludes a discourse connective (afterwards), an anaphoric element? The modality
introduced in βatt (I think) has scope over Fred’s trip to Dax or over the tempo-
ral succession of his trips, as shown in the coherent discourse in (6b). Therefore,
we propose to segment (6a) as shown, with the propositional attitudes in (6i)
and the discourse structure in (6ii). The segment β1 corresponds to β without
the discourse connective. So a propositional attitude can be assigned to eβ1 in
a standard way, see (6i). The notation seq(eα, eβ1) corresponds to the temporal
succession of eα and eβ1. seq(eα, eβ1) is expressed through afterwards in (6) and
not through an eventuality expression, however the temporal succession of two
events can be expressed with a “discourse verb” [3] such as precede or an NP such
as succession. Therefore, seq(eα, eβ1) is an element to which a propositional at-
titude value can be assigned, see (6i). The discourse structure in (6ii) indicates
that Narration (attributed to the writer) links β and β1, which is accurate.
(6)a. (Fred will go to Dax for Christmas)α. (I think that)βatt (afterwards (he
will go to Pau)β1)β .
i f(eα,Wr) = CT + ∧ (f(eβ1 ,Wr) = PR + ∨ f(eβ1 ,Wr) = CT +
∧ f(seq(eα, eβ1),Wr) = PR+)
ii AttributionWr(βatt, β) ∧ NarrationWr(α, β1)
b. Fred will go to Dax for Christmas. I think that afterwards he will go to
Pau. However, it is possible that he will not go to Pau or that he will go
to Pau before going to Dax.
We are now going to address the (difficult) issue of determining the source
of the discourse relation in a discourse constituent. In (7), segmented as (6),
6 L. Danlos and O. Rambow
Narration is necessarily attributed to the writer because of the semantics of the
factive verb know used in a negative form.
(7) (Fred will go to Dax for Christmas)α. (Jane doesn’t know that)βatt (after-
wards (he will go to Pau)β1)β .
i f(eα,Wr) = CT + ∧ f(eβ1 ,Wr) = CT + ∧ f(seq(eα, eβ1),Wr) = CT +
∧ f(eβ1 , Jane) = Uu ∧ f(seq(eα, eβ1), Jane) = Uu
ii AttributionWr(βatt, β) ∧ NarrationWr(α, β1)
On the other hand, in (8a), which differs from (7) only by the verb and polar-
ity used in βatt, Narration must be attributed to Jane. NarrationJane(α, β1)
implies that Jane is aware of Fred’s trip to Dax, as shown by the incoherence of
(8b). This results in fβ(eα, Jane) = CT+ with “completion” of the propositional
attitude value for eα relative to Jane. Indeed, α being asserted by the writer, no
value is assigned to f(eα, Jane). That is the reason why we speak of completion
(and not revision) of the propositional attitudes.
(8)a. (Fred will go to Dax for Christmas)α. (Jane thinks that)βatt (afterwards
(he will go to Pau)β1)β .
ii AttributionWr(βatt, β) ∧ NarrationJane(α, β1)
b. #Fred will go to Dax for Christmas, which Jane does not know. She thinks
that afterwards he will go to Pau.
In conclusion, propositional attitude information is crucial to identify the
sources of the discourse relations at stake. This is why step (iii) in our paradigm
should be performed after step (i).
4.3 Updating the Discourse Structure
This section, whose aim is to explain why the update of the discourse structure
must take into account propositional attitudes, focuses on the veridical relation
Contrast, lexically marked with yet or but. ContrastWr(α, β) is often observed
when there is an “unexpected result”, as illustrated in (9a) in which breastfeeding
normally entails ¬ constipated. When at least one of the arguments of Contrast
is attributed to a source other than the writer through factive verbs (confirm or
discover) as in (9b-d), ContrastWr(α, β) can be maintained.
(9)a. (Bébé is being breastfed)α, yet (he is constipated)β .
b. (Jane has confirmed that)αatt (she is breastfeeding Bébé)α, yet (he is
constipated)β .
c. (Bébé is being breastfed)α, yet (Julie has discovered that)βatt (he is constipated)β .
d. (Jane has confirmed that)αatt (Bébé is being breastfed)α, yet (Julie has
discovered that)βatt (he is constipated)β .
However, there are a number of examples built on the patterns in (9b-d) for
which Contrasts(α, β) cannot hold for any source s. First, consider examples
on the pattern of (9b) with β asserted by the writer, α attributed to another
source: in (10) eα = eβ , in (11) α entails that β cannot happen.
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(10)a. (Jane does not know that)αatt (Fred will go to Dax)α, but (he will)β .
b. (Jane does not think that)αatt (Fred will go to Dax)α, but (he will)β .
c. (Jane thinks that)αatt (Fred will not go to Dax)α, but (he will)β .
d. (Jane suspects that)αatt (her husband is cheating on her)α, but (he is
probably not)β .
(11)a. (Jane thinks that)αatt (only Fred will go to Dax)α, but (Paul will go,
too)β .
b. (Jane suspects that)αatt (her husband is cheating on her)α, but (he is
faithful to her)β .
When asserting β in (10) or (11), the writer gives evidence that Jane is wrong
concerning her propositional attitude towards eα: technically, in (10), fβ(eα,Wr) =
f(eβ ,Wr), in (11), fβ(eα,Wr) = CT− and in both casesfβ(eα,Wr) 6= f(eα, Jane).
The situation is similar with examples such as (12a-b) in which α is asserted
by the writer and β attributed to another source. The semantics of such examples
is mainly that the propositional attitude of Jane and the writer diverge towards
eβ : f(eβ , Jane) 6= fβ(eβ ,Wr). Finally, in (12c) with eα = eβ , fβ(eβ , Jane) 6=
fβ(eβ , Julie).
(12)a. (Fred will go to Dax)α, but (Julie does not think that)βatt (he will go)β .
b. (Fred never cheats on his wife)α, but (she suspects that)βatt (he is sleeping
around)β .
c. (Jane thinks that)αatt (Fred will go to Dax)α, but (Julie does not think
that)βatt (he will go)β .
It can be argued that each example of this section — except (9a) — can be
analyzed with a Contrast relation between two complex segments analyzed with
an Attribution relation, see the discourse structure in (13a) for (9d) or (12c),
in which the complex segments are surrounded by brackets. The attribution
text spans must then be considered as implicit for the segments asserted by the
writer, corresponding to I know or I affirm and noted αatt or βatt. See for
example (13b) for (12a).
(13)a. AttributionWr(αatt, α) ∧ AttributionWr(βatt, β)
∧ ContrastWr([αatt, α], [βatt, β])
b. AttributionWr(αatt, α) ∧ AttributionWr(βatt, β) ∧
ContrastWr([αatt, α], [βatt, β])
The discourse analyses in (13) are quite plausible, however it should be noted
that distributivity rules — see [2] for distributivity rules over complex segments
— such as ContrastWr([αatt, α], [βatt, β]) ⇒ ContrastWr(α, β) and the variants
of this rule when α or β is asserted by the writer cannot be maintained: they are
valid in (9b-d) but not in (10)-(12) for which ContrastWr(α, β) doesn’t hold.
Moreover, consider (14) which is identical to (9b) except that say is used
in αatt instead of confirm. This discourse is ambiguous in that the writer’s
opinion can be twofold: either she thinks that Jane is lying or she doesn’t.
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The lying case implies that the propositional attitudes towards α of Jane and
the writer differ (fβ(eα,Wr) = CT− and so fβ(eα,Wr) 6= f(eα, Jane)) as
in (10) or (11), and the writer underlines this difference. The non-lying case
implies that Jane and the writer share the same propositional attitude towards
α (fβ(eα,Wr) = f(eα, Jane) = CT+) and the writer underlines the contrast
between α and β as in (9b).
(14) (Jane said that)αatt (she is breastfeeding Bébé)α, but (he is constipated)β .
i f(eα, Jane) = CT + ∧ f(eα,Wr) = Uu ∧ f(eβ ,Wr) = CT+
In sum, it seems that we can postulate Rule 2 with a disjunction in the right
part. Determining which member(s) of the disjunction is (are) true depends both
on the semantics relation between α and β and on the propositional attitude
value assigned to f(eα,Wr). Similar rules could be postulated as well when α
is asserted by the writer, β being or not asserted by the writer.
Rule 1 ContrastWr([αatt, α], [βatt, β]) ⇒ ContrastWr(α, β) ∨ R(α, β)
6
In conclusion, the various examples discussed in this section about Contrast
show that the discourse structure crucially depends on the event propositional
attitude information. That is the reason why we claim that step (ii) should be
performed after step (i) in our new paradigm for discourse analysis (Section 3).
5 Conclusion and perspectives
We have proposed a new paradigm for discourse analysis in which expressed
propositional attitude information (such as that given in FactBank) plays a
crucial role. This article sketches an initial outline for this new paradigm and
a number of (technical) issues that still require attention. Specifically, we have
seen that the “lying” interpretation requires an explicit modeling of the difference
between expressed and inferred (revised) propositional attitude.
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